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Abstract
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1 Introduction
At the basis of the theory of learning in games is the question as to whether Nash
equilibria are stable or unstable, attractors, saddles or repellors. The hope is to predict
play: if an equilibrium is an attractor for a plausible learning dynamic, we think that it
is a possible outcome for actual play. However, testing such a prediction is complicated
by the fact that there are several measures of whether play is at or near an equilibrium.
Particularly, for mixed Nash equilibria, as players’ mixed strategies are not directly
observable, necessarily in empirical work researchers must look at play averaged over
a number of periods, at least as a first approximation. On the other hand, if a Nash
equilibrium is unstable, we would expect actual players, for example, subjects in an
experiment, not to play that equilibrium or even to be close to it. Shapley (1964)
famously found that there are games for which learning may not approach the only
Nash equilibrium but rather will continuously cycle. If we take this result seriously as
an empirical prediction, then there are games in which Nash equilibrium play will never
emerge. Note that as Shapley’s result also holds for average play, even average play
should not be close to an unstable equilibrium.
In this paper, we have the surprising finding that in games with a mixed equilibrium
the time average of play may converge even when players’ mixed strategies do not. If
an equilibrium is unstable under stochastic fictitious play with the classical assumption
that players place an equal weight on all past experience, then both mixed strategies
and time averages must diverge from equilibrium. But we find that if greater weight is
placed on more recent experience, as it is in “weighted” fictitious play, then although
the players’ mixed strategies will approach the cycle of the type found by Shapley, the
time average will converge. We show that, as the level of noise and the level of forgetting
approach zero, the time average of play approaches the TASP (Time Average of the
Shapley Polygon), that is, the time average of the Shapley cycle under the continuous
time best response dynamics. We find that in many cases the TASP is close to the Nash
equilibrium. Since the time average is much easier to observe than mixed strategies, it
may well appear that play has converged to the equilibrium. We go on to identify games
where the TASP and Nash equilibrium are quite distinct, and so oﬀer the possibility of
a clearer empirical test between the two.
These results are not of purely theoretical interest. They, in fact, arise in direct
response to recent experimental work on the economically important phenomenon of
price dispersion. Cason and Friedman (2003) and Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (2004)
report on experimental investigations of the price dispersion models of Burdett and
Judd (1983) and Varian (1980) respectively. Both studies report aggregate data that
is remarkably close to the price distribution that would be generated if the subjects
had been playing the mixed Nash equilibrium. This is surprising if one takes learning
theory seriously, as earlier results by Hopkins and Seymour (2002) indicate that the
mixed equilibria of these models are unstable under most common learning processes.
Cason, Friedman and Wagener (2005) reexamine the data from Cason and Friedman
(2003) and indeed find that play is highly non-stationary and there are clear cycles
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present. They therefore reject the hypothesis that subjects were in fact playing Nash
equilibrium. This is also consistent with the earlier results of Brown Kruse et al. (1994).
They find, in an experimental study of a Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly market with
no pure equilibrium, that prices cycle but prices averaged across the whole session
still approximate the mixed equilibrium distribution. Our results explain the apparent
empirical paradox. When mixed equilibria are unstable under learning, we predict
persistent cycles in play. Nonetheless, if players learn placing more weight on recent
experience, the time average of play should converge to close to the Nash equilibrium.
Fictitious play was introduced many years ago with the underlying principle that
players play a best response to their beliefs about opponents, beliefs that are constructed
from the average past play of opponents. This we refer to as players having “classical”
beliefs. It was in this framework that Shapley (1964) obtained his famous result. This
has also been the basis for more recent work on smooth or stochastic fictitious play
(see Fudenberg and Levine (1998) for a survey). However, experimental work has found
greater success with generalisations of fictitious play that allow for players constructing
beliefs by placing greater weight on more recent events (see Cheung and Friedman
(1997), Camerer and Ho (1999) amongst many others). This is called forgetting or
recency or weighted fictitious play. Despite their empirical success, models with recency
have not received much theoretical analysis, largely because they are more diﬃcult to
analyze than equivalent models with classical beliefs. This paper represents one of the
first attempts.
Many years ago, Edgeworth (1925) predicted persistent cycles in a competitive sit-
uation where the only Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies. This view was for a
long while superseded by faith that rational agents would play Nash equilibrium, no
matter how complicated the model or market. In the case of mixed strategies, learning
theory provides some support for Edgeworth, persistent cycles are a possibility even
when agents have memory of more than the one period Edgeworth assumed (though in
other games, learning will converge even to a mixed equilibrium). Furthermore, recent
learning models that allow for stochastic choices do not imply the naive, predictable
cycles described by Edgeworth. Cycles may only be detectable by statistical tests for
non-stationarity (see Cason, Friedman and Wagener (2005)). In the absence of such
sophisticated analysis, these perturbed Edgeworth-Shapley cycles may to an outside
observer look indistinguishable from mixed equilibrium.
Thus, it is possible in principle to distinguish between the TASP and equilibrium
play by testing for stationarity. However, it would be convenient to have a simpler
way of distinguishing between the two. We therefore construct some examples of games
where the TASP and Nash equilibrium are quite distinct. These should make possible
a simple test simply based on average play. We also find that the comparative statics
of the TASP with respect to changes in payoﬀs diﬀer from those of Nash equilibrium.
We are therefore optimistic that the theoretical results of this paper can and will be
tested.
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2 AnOverview: Shapley Polygons versus Edgeworth
Cycles
We start with a generalisation of the well-known Rock-Scissors-Paper game and two
specific examples,
RSP =
0 −a2 b3
b1 0 −a3
−a1 b2 0
A =
0 -1 3
2 0 -1
-1 3 0
B =
0 -3 1
1 0 -2
-3 1 0
(1)
Game A and game B both have a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, for
A, x∗ = (13, 10, 9)/32 = (0.40625, 0.3125, 0.28125) and, for B, x∗ = (9, 10, 13)/32 =
(0.28125, 0.3125, 0.40625). They appear to be very similar. Learning theory, however,
says that they are quite diﬀerent. Specifically, if a single large population players
are repeatedly randomly matched to play one of these games, most learning and/or
evolutionary dynamics, such as fictitious play, the replicator dynamics, reinforcement
learning, stochastic fictitious play, should converge to (close to) the Nash equilibrium
in game A, but should diverge from equilibrium in game B.
Suppose we try to test this prediction experimentally. We assemble a group of sub-
jects in a laboratory and we repeatedly match them randomly in pairs to play one of
the two games. Now, mixed strategies are intrinsically hard to measure. So, suppose
as a first approximation, we simply calculate the average frequency of each strategy
over the whole experimental session. The claim in the current paper is that, with suﬃ-
ciently high monetary incentives, we would expect to see an average of approximately
(0.41, 0.31, 0.28) in game A, and approximately (0.29, 0.34, 0.37) in game B. In the
second game, play is not as close to Nash equilibrium as in the first, but since experi-
mental data is usually fairly noisy, one might well conclude that this was a reasonable
approximation, and convergence had taken place. This would of course lead one to
reject the prediction of learning theory that play in the two games should be funda-
mentally diﬀerent. What we find in this paper is that while learning behaviour in the
two games is similar in terms of average frequencies, it will be quite diﬀerent on other
measures.
Shapley (1964) was the first to show that there are games in which a learning process
does not converge to a Nash equilibrium. Instead, the fictitious play process that he
examined converged to a cycle of increasing length. We can recreate Shapley’s result in
the context of a single large population who are repeatedly randomly matched in pairs
to play a normal form game such as A or B above. Fictitious play assumes that agents
play a best response given their beliefs. The vector xt represents the belief at time t,
with xit the probability given to an opponent playing his i-th strategy. An agent then
chooses a pure strategy that is in the set of best responses to her current beliefs, or
b(xt).1 The dynamic equation for the fictitious play process in a single population will
1As b(·) is not in general single valued, the dynamics arising from fictitious play present certain
mathematical diﬃculties. See Benaïm et al. (2003) for a full treatment.
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be
xt+1 − xt ∈ γt(b(xt)− xt). (2)
with γt being the step size. Classically, beliefs are assumed to be based on the average of
past play by their opponents, which implies that the step size will be equal to 1/(t+1).
An alternative, that is explored in this paper, is that players place a weight of one on last
period’s observation, a weight δ on the previous period, and δn−1 on their experience n
periods ago, for some δ ∈ [0, 1). Then the step size γt will be 1− δ, a constant.
Suppose that δ takes the extreme value of 0, “Cournot beliefs”, so that players play a
best response to the last choice of their opponent. In RSP, as Rock is the best response
to Scissors which is the best response to Paper, we would see a cycle of the form
P, S,R, P, S,R, P, S,R, ....
This is a very simple example of an “Edgeworth cycle” of best responses. Clearly, if
players follow this cycle the time average of their play will converge to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Of course, for some RSP games, this will be equal to or be close to the mixed Nash
equilibrium. However, one would not describe this type of behaviour as equilibrium
play, as it involves predictable cycles rather than randomisation. Or, more formally,
there is only convergence of the time average, but not marginal frequencies.
Under classical beliefs, change will be more gradual. For example, in the case of
game B if beliefs are at a point to the right of A1 in Figure 1, where x1 is relatively high,
the best response will be the second strategy, or b(xt) = e2 = (0, 1, 0). Agents in the
population play the second strategy and beliefs about the likelihood of seeing strategy
2 increase. Beliefs move in the direction of the vertex where x2 = 1, until they approach
near A2, and strategy 3 becomes a best response. Then, beliefs will move toward the
vertex e3 = (0, 0, 1) until strategy 1 becomes the best response. That is, there will be
cyclical motion about the Nash equilibrium. In game A, it can be shown that over time
the cycles converge on the Nash equilibrium, but in game B beliefs converge to the
triangle A1A2A3 illustrated in Figure 1 and the cycles are persistent.
The easiest way to prove such convergence results is to use the continuous time best
response (BR) dynamics, defined as
x˙ ∈ b(x)− x. (3)
For a class of games including the game B given in (1), Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer
(1995) show that the best response dynamics converge to the “Shapley polygon” (Gilboa
and Matsui (1991) use the term “cyclically stable set”).
Definition 1 A Shapley polygon is a polygon in SN withM vertices A1, ..., AM which
is a closed orbit for the best response dynamics (3).
We label an edge the ith edge if on that edge the ith strategy is being played.
That is, on that edge, b(x) = ei, that is the vector with 1 at position i and zero
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Figure 1: The Shapley triangle for game B with the TASP (T) and the Nash equilibrium
(N).
elsewhere. Suppose that at some time t0, the dynamics (3) are at vertex Ai−1. Denote
the coordinates of the ith vertex as xAi. Then, because between Ai−1 and Ai the best
response b(x) is ei, the BR dynamics imply the linear diﬀerential equation x˙i = 1− xi
with initial condition xi(t0) = x
Ai−1
i . Thus, we have on that edge xi(t0 + t) = 1 +
exp(−t)(xAi−1i −1). Let Ti be the total time spent by the continuous time BR dynamics
on the ith edge. Or, let Ti solve x
Ai
i = 1 + exp(−Ti)(x
Ai−1
i − 1).
Definition 2 Define the TASP (time average of the Shapley Polygon) as
x˜i =
TiPM
j=1 Tj
(4)
That is, over one complete circuit of the Shapley polygon, x˜i is the proportion of time
spent on side i.
Now, Shapley polygons do not exist for every game. For example there, in game A
in (1) the Nash equilibrium is a global attractor for the best response dynamics and
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there is no Shapley polygon. But for the game B, there is a Shapley triangle (which is
unique and asymptotically stable) and, following Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995),
we can calculate that A1 = (6, 1, 3)/10, A2 = (2, 6, 1)/9, and A3 = (1, 3, 9)/13 as shown
in Figure 1. The TASP can be computed numerically as x˜ ≈ (0.29, 0.34, 0.37), marked
as “T” in Figure 1.
Benaïm et al. (2003) recently have extended the theory of stochastic approximation
to show that for the game B under classical fictitious play beliefs the discrete time
dynamic (2) will approach the Shapley polygon. That is, there will be persistent cycles
in beliefs, not convergence to equilibrium. Now, under fictitious play beliefs, the speed
of learning declines each period with accumulated experience. So, movement around
the cycle is slower and slower. Observed play might look like this
P, S,R, P, P, S, S,R,R, P, P, P, S, S, S,R,R,R, ....
Consequently, the time average of play does not converge, see Monderer and Shapley
(1996, Lemma 1) for a general proof.
But what if players place greater weight on more recent experience, with δ not at the
extreme value of 0? We show in the current paper that, like for classical fictitious play,
beliefs will cycle around the Shapley polygon (or close to it), but at constant speed.
Consequently, we can show that, like for the simple Edgeworth cycles, average play will
converge, and for δ close to one this time average will be close to the TASP.
Now, as we see in Figure 1, the TASP is close to the Nash equilibrium of the game
B. So, if the population of players do in fact learn according to weighted fictitious
play, then average play will be close to the Nash equilibrium because average play will
be close to the TASP. However, beliefs will continue to cycle. In contrast, in game A
both beliefs and average play will converge to the Nash equilibrium. The problem is
that beliefs are not directly observable, whereas average play which can be seen, can be
misleading. It would be very easy for an experimenter to conclude in the case of game
B that play had converged to the Nash equilibrium, when in reality only average play
had converged, and to the TASP and not to the Nash equilibrium.
It is true that the simple cycles described above would be easy to spot both by
experimenters and the players themselves.2 However, consider a learning model that
is more empirically plausible such as stochastic fictitious play, that introduces random
choice into play. This stochastic element breaks up the cycles and would make them
much less obvious. It also makes each player’s choices less easy to exploit by her
opponent(s). Nonetheless, we show in Section 6 that the time average of weighted
stochastic fictitious play will definitely converge, and for a low level of noise this average
will also be close to the TASP. That is, play is stochastic and non-stationary, but all
the same will have a time average that can be close to Nash equilibrium. We think this
helps to explain what has been seen in a number of recent experiments. We discuss this
in more detail in Section 8, but first we look at the theory in greater detail.
2Indeed, since the influential work of Brown and Rosenthal (1990), experimenters dealing with
mixed strategy equilibria have been careful to check whether there is autocorrelation in play.
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3 The Model
Stochastic fictitious play was introduced by Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) and is further
analysed in Benaïm and Hirsch (1999), Hopkins (1999a, 2002), Ellison and Fudenberg
(2000), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), Hofbauer and Hopkins (2004). Models of this
kind have been applied to experimental data by Cheung and Friedman (1997), Camerer
and Ho (1999), Battalio et al. (2001) among others. We will see that under the classical
case of fictitious play beliefs, where every observation is given an equal weight, that
stochastic fictitious play gives clear predictions. Specifically, some mixed equilibria are
stable, others unstable and the behaviour of learning in the two diﬀerent cases is quite
diﬀerent. However, the experimental studies cited above all find that players seem to
place greater weight on more recent events than is suggested by the classical model.
When this behaviour is included in a theoretical model, the diﬀerence between stable
and unstable equilibria is significantly weakened, with potentially very little diﬀerence
in terms of average play.
Stochastic fictitious play embodies the idea that players play, with high probability,
a best response to their beliefs about opponents’ actions. Here, we concentrate on two
player matrix games with N strategies and payoﬀ matrix A. That is, for those familiar
with evolutionary game theory, initially we analyse a single population learning model,
rather than the two population asymmetric case which we investigate later in Section
7. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, ..... We write the beliefs of a player as
xt = (x1t, x2t, ...., xNt), where in this context x1t is the subjective probability in period
t that the next opponent will play his first strategy in that period. That is, xt ∈ SN
where SN is the simplex {x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ RN :
P
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0, for i = 1, ..., N}.
This implies that the vector of expected payoﬀs of the diﬀerent strategies for any player,
given her beliefs, will be Axt. We write the interior of the simplex, that is where all
strategies have positive representation, as intSN and its complement, the boundary of
the simplex as ∂SN . We also make use of the tangent space of SN , which we denote
RN0 = {ξ ∈ RN :
P
ξi = 0}.
Given fictitious play beliefs, if a player were to adopt a strategy p ∈ SN , she would
expect payoﬀs of p ·Ax. Following Fudenberg and Levine (1999, p. 118 ﬀ), we suppose
payoﬀs are perturbed such that payoﬀs are in fact given by
π(p, x) = p ·Ax+ λv(p) (5)
where λ > 0. Here the function v : intSN → R is defined at least for completely mixed
strategies p ∈ intSN and has the following properties:
1. v is strictly concave, more precisely its second derivative v00 is negative definite,
i.e., ξ · v00(p)ξ < 0 for all p ∈ intSN and all nonzero vectors ξ ∈ RN0 .
2. The gradient of v becomes arbitrarily large near the boundary of the simplex, i.e.,
limp→∂SN |v0(p)| =∞.
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One possible interpretation of the above conditions is that the player has a con-
trol cost to implementing a mixed strategy with the cost becoming larger nearer the
boundary. In any case, these conditions imply that for each fixed x ∈ SN there is a
unique p = p(x) ∈ intSN which maximizes the perturbed payoﬀ π(p, x) for the player.
Rather than using the best reply correspondence b(x), instead we employ a ‘perturbed
best reply function’ p(x). Typical examples of perturbation functions that satisfy these
conditions are v(p) =
P
i log pi and v(p) = −
P
i pi log pi.
Diﬀerentiating the perturbed payoﬀ functions (5), the first order conditions for a
maximum will be
ξ ·Ax+ λv01(p(x))ξ = 0 ∀ξ ∈ RN0 . (6)
This could be written formally as
p(x) = (v0)−1(−βAx). (7)
where β = 1/λ. This shows that the perturbed best reply function p is smooth. How-
ever, an explicit evaluation of p seems to be possible only in special cases, see (10)
below.
The original formulation of stochastic fictitious play due to Fudenberg and Kreps
(1993), see also Fudenberg and Levine (1998, p. 105 ﬀ), involved a truly stochastic
perturbation of payoﬀs. For example, one can replace (5) with
π(p, x) = p ·Ax+ λp · ε, (8)
where ε is a vector of i.i.d. random variables with a fixed distribution function and a
strictly positive and bounded density. Assume each player sees the realisation of her
own perturbation, then chooses an action to maximise the perturbed payoﬀ. Then, the
probability that she will choose action i will be
pi(x) = Pr(argmax
j
[(Ax)j + λεj] = i). (9)
This defines a smooth function p(x) which approximates the best reply correspondence.
As Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) show, the truly stochastic formulation is a special
case of the deterministic approach given above. The best-known special case is the
exponential or logit rule,
peit = p
e
i (xt) =
expβ(Axt)iPN
j=1 expβ(Axt)j
, (10)
where β = 1/λ and “e” is for exponential. It arises from the stochastic setting (9) if
each εj is drawn from the double exponential extreme value distribution, and from the
deterministic smoothing (7) for v(p) = −
P
i pi log pi. Note that for the logit rule, if β
is large, the strategy with highest expected payoﬀ is chosen with probability close to
one. If β is (close to) zero, then each strategy is chosen with probability (close to) 1/N ,
irrespective of the relative expected payoﬀs.
We now turn to the dynamic process by which beliefs are updated. We look at two
cases:
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1. Large Population Deterministic Model: each period the whole population is ran-
domly matched in pairs to play. After each round the vector Xt ∈ SN of actions
chosen by those who play is publicly announced.
2. Stochastic Model: each round only one pair is randomly drawn out of the popu-
lation to play once. They are then returned to the population and the next round
there is another random draw of a pair. After each round the vector Xt ∈ SN
representing the action chosen by one of the players who played is publicly an-
nounced.
In the first case, the law of large numbers ensures that, given current beliefs xt,
realised play is Xt = p(xt). In the second case, the play that is realised is a random
draw with probabilities given by p(xt). In either case, each individual then updates her
belief according to the rule,
xt+1 = (1− γt)xt + γtXt. (11)
The step-size γt will play an important role in our analysis. Under classical fictitious
play one sets γt = 1/(t+ 1). That is
xt+1 =
Xt +Xt−1 + · · ·+X1 + x1
t+ 1
,
or all observations and initial beliefs x1 are given equal weight.3 Here, we explore the
implications if players place an exponentially declining weight on past experience with
δ being the forgetting factor. This implies that γt = 1− δ, a constant, as
xt+1 = δxt + (1− δ)Xt = (1− δ)
¡
Xt + δ
2Xt−1 + · · ·+ δtX1
¢
+ δt+1x1, .
Setting δ = 0 induces “Cournot” beliefs, only the last period matters, while as δ ap-
proaches 1, the updating of beliefs approaches that of classical fictitious play.
If we assume that all agents have the same initial belief and use the same updating
rule then, in the large population case, the beliefs in the population will evolve according
to
xt+1 − xt = γt(p(xt)− xt) (12)
where γt is the step size. In the stochastic model, the above equation of motion gives
the expected change in beliefs (see Section 6 below). We will also need the continuous
time equivalent to the above discrete dynamic. We have already seen the BR dynamics
(3) which corresponds to (2). For the perturbed process (12), we clearly have
x˙ = p(x)− x, (13)
which we can call the perturbed best response (PBR) dynamics.
3One can give a diﬀerent weight to initial beliefs and more generally still one can simply say the
step size is of order 1/t.
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As is now well known, the steady states of stochastic fictitious play and, equally, the
PBR dynamics are not Nash equilibria. Rather, they are perturbed equilibria known
as quantal response equilibria (QRE) or logit equilibria.4 Specifically, a perturbed
equilibrium xˆ satisfies
xˆ = p(xˆ). (14)
Of course, what this equilibrium relationship implies is that beliefs must be accurate or
equilibrium beliefs xˆ are equal to the equilibrium mixed strategy p(xˆ).
4 Results on the Associated Continuous Time Sys-
tems
The learning processes that we analyse unfold in discrete time. However, to understand
their asymptotic behaviour, it will be crucial to look at some associated continuous time
dynamics, the BR (3) and PBR (13) dynamics. Clearly, these are the continuous time
analogues of (2) and (12) respectively.
We consider a class of games that Hofbauer (1995) calls monocyclic (see also, Hof-
bauer and Sigmund (1998, Chapter 14.5)) that generalises the RSP game given in (1).
They are two player normal form games with a payoﬀ matrix A that has the following
properties:
1. aii = 0
2. aij > 0 for i ≡ j + 1 (mod N) and aij < 0 else.
The first condition is only a convenient normalisation. Clearly, the strategic prop-
erties of these games would not be altered by the addition of a constant to a column.
Monocylic games do not have equilibria in pure strategies, only mixed equilibria. How-
ever, the equilibria of monocyclic games are not necessarily unique and do not have to
be fully mixed (see Example 1 below).
Equilibria of monocyclic games can be stable or unstable under learning. For exam-
ple, under the continuous time BR dynamics, there is a knife-edge. In particular, if x∗
is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium, so that x∗ ·Ax∗ is the equilibrium payoﬀ, then
if x∗ ·Ax∗ < 0, the equilibrium is unstable, but if x∗ ·Ax∗ ≥ 0, then the equilibrium x∗
is globally asymptotically stable (see Hofbauer (1995)). For the particular case of 3× 3
monocyclic games with an unstable mixed equilibrium, Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer
(1994) show that the best response dynamics converge to the “Shapley triangle” intro-
duced in Section 2. The essence of the proof is that it establishes that the best response
dynamics in monocyclic games move toward the set defined by max(Ax)i = 0. That
4The literature on these perturbed equilibria is now extensive. See, for example, McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995).
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is, the set where the best payoﬀ against the current population state is zero. In games
where equilibrium payoﬀs are negative, this set is distinct from the Nash equilibrium
and so the dynamics must diverge from equilibrium. In contrast, the Shapley polygon
is contained in this set.5 In fact, in the 3 × 3 case the Shapley triangle and the set
max(Ax)i = 0 are identical.
Proposition 1 Suppose the game A is monocyclic, has a fully mixed Nash equilibrium
x∗ and x∗ · Ax∗ < 0. Then the mixed Nash equilibrium x∗ is unstable under the best
response dynamics (3). Furthermore, there is a Shapley polygon, and from an open,
dense and full measure set of initial conditions, the best response dynamics converge
to this Shapley polygon. The time average from these initial conditions converge to the
TASP x˜. That is,
lim
T→∞
1
T
Z T
0
x(t)dt = x˜
Proof: In the Appendix.
Note that the above proposition does not claim that there is convergence to the
Shapley polygon from all initial conditions. For example, there may be mixed strategy
equilibria that are saddle points, and thus attract some initial conditions. The following
examples may help to clarify matters.6
Example 1 Take the game
A =
0 -1 -1 1
1 0 -1 -1
-1 1 0 -1
-1 -1 1 0
(15)
This is a monocyclic game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium at x∗ = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)
with equilibrium payoﬀs x∗ · Ax∗ = −1/4 < 0. From initial states x with x1 = x3 and
x2 = x4 there is an orbit heading straight into x∗. From all other points orbits converge
to the Shapley polygon. Hence x∗ is a saddle point.
Example 2 Now consider the game
A =
0 -3 -1 1
1 0 -3 -1
-1 1 0 -3
-3 -1 1 0
(16)
This is a monocyclic game with a mixed strategy equilibrium at x∗ = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)
with equilibrium payoﬀs −3/4. Since the game is positive definite (see below), x∗ is a
5This relies on the assumption that A is normalised so that Aii = 0 for all i.
6We thank Martin Hahn for providing us with these examples.
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repellor under the best response dynamics. There are six further Nash equilibria, two at
(1/2, 0, 1/2, 0) and (0, 1/2, 0, 1/2), and four that mix between three pure strategies. All
these are saddle points under the best response dynamics and attract either a one or
two dimensional set of initial conditions. Still, almost all orbits approach the Shapley
polygon.
This form of diﬃculty will not be a problem when we turn to stochastic models in
Section 6. There, as we will see, all our results are independent of initial conditions.
We can classify single-matrix games into three classes: negative definite, positive
definite and indefinite. A game is negative definite if ξ · Aξ < 0 for any ξ ∈ Rn0 \ 0.
Importantly, for negative definite games, there is a unique Nash equilibrium and this
is an ESS and a global attractor for the evolutionary replicator dynamics, the best
response dynamics and the perturbed best response dynamics, see Hofbauer (2000).
On the other hand, a game is positive definite if ξ · Aξ > 0 for any ξ ∈ Rn0 \ 0. In
positive definite games, any fully mixed equilibrium is a global repellor for the replicator
dynamics. For the best response dynamics see Proposition 2 below. If a game is
indefinite, then a mixed equilibrium might be stable under some dynamics or learning
processes but be unstable under others. Mono-cyclic games can fall into any of these
three classes. That is, their mixed equilibrium can be stable or unstable under learning
and/or evolutionary dynamics. Note that for positive definite monocyclic games we
have (x−x∗) ·A(x−x∗) = (x−x∗) ·Ax > 0, where x∗ is a fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
Take x = ej, then as in monocyclic games ej · Aej = 0, we have x∗ · Aej < 0 for all j
and hence x∗ ·Ax∗ < 0. That is, the Nash equilibrium payoﬀ is negative. Consequently,
if a game is positive definite then by Proposition 1, any fully mixed equilibrium will
be unstable for the BR dynamics. However, positive definiteness is a stronger than the
negative equilibrium payoﬀ condition, as there are games that not positive definite but
for which x∗ · Ax∗ < 0, and positive definiteness leads to the stronger result that the
mixed equilibrium is completely repelling.
Proposition 2 In a positive definite game, every fully mixed equilibrium is a repellor
and every non-strict equilibrium is unstable under the best response dynamics.
Proof: In the Appendix.
We also have an instability result for the perturbed best response dynamics. Note
that a perturbed mixed equilibrium can only be unstable if the parameter β = 1/λ is
suﬃciently high. For very low levels of β, the perturbed best response dynamics simply
converge to the centre of the simplex, which represents players picking actions entirely
at random.
Proposition 3 Suppose A is positive definite so that ξ · Aξ > 0 for all ξ ∈ RN0 \ 0,
then there exists a β∗ > 0 such that for all β > β∗ the fixed point xˆ of the perturbed best
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response dynamics (13) corresponding to a completely mixed equilibrium is repelling.
Furthermore, for any β > 0 all orbits are bounded away from the boundary of the
simplex. That is, xi(t) > C(β) > 0 for large t > 0.
Proof: In the Appendix.
5 Convergence of Average Play
We now consider what the above results on continuous time systems imply for the un-
derlying discrete time learning processes. Consider a monocyclic game, with a mixed
equilibrium unstable under the continuous time replicator dynamics and the best re-
sponse dynamics. Clearly, we would expect beliefs for the discrete time system (2) to
diverge as well. However, what happens to the time average of play and of beliefs?
Remember that under fictitious play xt the state variable represents beliefs. The pure
strategy that is actually played is given by b(xt). Let wt be the time average of play,
and wˆt the time average of beliefs, under this process. That is,
wt =
1
t
tX
s=1
b(xs), wˆt =
1
t
tX
s=1
xs.
For the perturbed process (12) corresponding to stochastic fictitious play, we can ex-
amine similar averages. We can write them as, respectively,
zt =
1
t
tX
s=1
p(xs), zˆt =
1
t
tX
s=1
xs.
Proposition 4 Suppose the game A is monocyclic, has a fully mixed Nash equilibrium
x∗ and x∗ · Ax∗ < 0. Assume the step size γt = γ, a constant. Then for the discrete
time best response dynamics (2), for almost all initial conditions x
lim
γ→0
lim
t→∞
wt = lim
γ→0
lim
t→∞
wˆt = x˜.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Now the upper-semicontinuity result in the proof covers also the discretizations (12)
since all limit points of p(y) as y → x and β →∞ are contained in b(x). Therefore we
obtain,
Proposition 5 Suppose the game A is monocyclic, has a fully mixed Nash equilibrium
x∗ and x∗ · Ax∗ < 0. Assume the step size γt = γ, a constant. Then, for the discrete
time perturbed best response dynamics (12) from almost all initial conditions x
lim
β→∞,γ→0
lim
t→∞
zt = lim
β→∞,γ→0
lim
t→∞
zˆt = x˜.
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The importance of this result is that the time average of play in the large population
model of stochastic fictitious play converges to the TASP.
Corollary 1 Suppose the game A is monocyclic, has a fully mixed Nash equilibrium x∗
and x∗ ·Ax∗ < 0. Then, in the large population model of weighted stochastic fictitious
play, for any ε > 0, for all values of β and t suﬃciently large and δ suﬃciently close
to one that the time average of play zt and the TASP x˜ satisfy ||zt − x˜|| < ε.
We can compare the result of fictitious play under recency with two alternatives.
First, what happens to fictitious play under classical beliefs, where every observation
is given an equal weight? Proposition 1 establishes that in a class of monocyclic games
mixed equilibria are unstable under the BR dynamics, and by the stochastic approxi-
mation results of Benaïm et al. (2003), beliefs under fictitious play should also diverge
from these equilibria. Since by definition classical beliefs are formed from the time
average of play, the time average, as for the BR dynamics, for most initial conditions
should approach the Shapley polygon. That is, there will be persistent cycles in the
time average of play and not convergence. Second, with very short memory as in a
Cournot adjustment process, that is if we take the limit of γ to one, the time averages
wt and wˆt go to (1, ..., 1)/N as play cycles over the corners of the simplex. Similarly,
taking the double limit of β to infinity and γ to one, the time averages zt and zˆt would
also go to (1, ...., 1)/N .
One might also think that results on average play would be possible by taking the
limit of the optimisation parameter β downwards. Certainly, by results in Hopkins
(1999a) the mixed equilibrium of a monocyclic game will be locally asymptotically
stable for β suﬃciently low. Thus, for very low levels of β and γ the time averages of
the PBR dynamics zt and zˆt will be equal to xˆ the perturbed equilibrium. However,
as β increases the perturbed equilibrium becomes unstable. The problem is that, for
values of β close to the critical value β∗, little can be said about the attractors and the
time averages of the PBR dynamics. This is why we concentrate in the above results on
the limit where β is large and most orbits converge to a neighbourhood of the Shapley
polygon.
6 Stochastic Models
In this section, we consider stochastic fictitious play. Now the the evolution of be-
liefs is random rather than deterministic. This is because, first, choice is random, the
choice probabilities of any agent are given by p(xt) where p(·) is the perturbed best
response function. Furthermore, as only one player is observed each period, there is no
opportunity for noise at the individual level to be evened out over a large population.
We show that weighted stochastic fictitious play is ergodic, so that there is a unique
limiting distribution independent of initial conditions. This implies that the time aver-
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age of play always converges - in distinct contrast to the results under classical beliefs.7
Furthermore, in the limit as the forgetting parameter δ approaches one, in monocyclic
games with an unstable mixed equilibrium, this distribution places no weight on the
equilibrium, but rather is clustered on the Shapley polygon. Consequently, as the opti-
misation parameter β becomes large, the time average of the stochastic fictitious play
system approaches the TASP. Or, simply put, when the mixed equilibrium is unstable,
we expect the time average of stochastic fictitious play to be close to the TASP.
Under the assumptions of the stochastic model, observed play Xt is determined
randomly with probabilities p(xt). One can therefore calculate that the expected change
in xt will be
E(xt+1|xt)− xt = γt(p(xt)− xt), (17)
where under weighted stochastic fictitious play γt = 1 − δ. This defines a Markov
process with the state of the process at any time given by xt ∈ SN , that is, the vector
of beliefs. This obviously evolves according to the actions chosen by the representative
player. Some results follow based on techniques developed by Norman (1968). We show
that the stochastic process is ergodic. That is, its limit distribution is independent of
initial conditions and the time average zt always converges.
Proposition 6 Weighted stochastic fictitious play is ergodic, with an invariant distri-
bution νδ(x) on SN . This implies that
Pr( lim
t→∞
zt = p˜δ) = 1
where p˜δ ∈ SN and p˜δ =
R
p(x)dνδ(x).
Proof: In the Appendix.
The task now is to characterise the unique limiting distribution. It is important
to realise that the theory of stochastic approximation still has a lot to say when γt is
constant, provided it is “small”. In the model considered here, this is equivalent to δ
being close to one. We can then show that the invariant distribution places no weight on
the repulsive equilibrium. That is, when the perturbed equilibrium is unstable under
the PBR dynamics, stochastic fictitious play with forgetting diverges from that rest
point as well.
Let φβ denote the perturbed best response vector field. That is
φβ(x) = −x+ p(x)
for x ∈ SN (the subscript is a reminder that given the definition (7) of the perturbed
best response function p(x), the vector field φ is parameterised by β). The Birkhoﬀ
center of φβ is the closure of the set of points x ∈ SN for which x ∈ ω(x), where ω(x)
is the omega limit set of x for φβ.
7For examples of simple games where the time average of stochastic fictitious play with classical
beliefs does not converge, see Benaïm and Hirsch (1999).
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Proposition 7 Let ν0 be a limit point (for the topology of weak* convergence) of {νδ}
(when δ 7→ 1). Then
(i) The support of ν0 is contained in the Birkhoﬀ center of φβ.
(ii) If the game is positive definite and has a fully mixed equilibrium x∗ then there exists
β∗ > 0 such that for any β > β∗
ν0(xˆ) = 0,
where xˆ is the perturbed equilibrium (satisfying φβ(xˆ) = 0) near x
∗.
Proof: In the Appendix.
So, the limit distribution of the weighted fictitious play process places no weight on
the fully mixed equilibrium point. It then follows that, if there are no other equilibria,
the distribution must put all its weight on the Shapley polygon, and the time average
must approach the TASP.
Proposition 8 Assume A is positive definite, has a unique Nash equilibrium that is
fully mixed, and has a unique Shapley polygon that attracts all orbits of the BR dynamics
(3) starting away from the equilibrium. Then,
lim
β→∞
p˜0 = lim
β→∞
Z
p(x) dν0(x) = x˜. (18)
Proof: The limit of the invariant measure ν0 as β goes to ∞ is an invariant measure
ν of the best response dynamics8. Proposition 7 (ii) implies that ν(x∗) = 0. Therefore
ν is the unique invariant measure concentrated on the Shapley polygon and the result
follows from the ergodic theorem.
This result applies to any Rock-Scissors-Paper game (1) that is positive definite,
such as game B: the time average of weighted stochastic fictitious play approaches
the TASP as δ → 1 and β → ∞. However, in contrast for games like Example 2 in
Section 4 that have multiple equilibria, we cannot be so sure. Although in Example 2 all
the Nash equilibria are unstable under the BR dynamics, some are saddlepoints. The
question whether the limit invariant distribution of a constant step stochastic process
can put positive weight on equilibria that are unstable under the associated ODE has
only recently been addressed, see Benaïm (1999) and Fort and Pagès (1999). Though
this recent work establishes that no weight can be placed on a point that is completely
repulsive (all eigenvalues positive), saddlepoints can have positive weight, albeit only
in some rather exotic dynamical systems.9 Unfortunately, conditions that are suﬃcient
8See Miller and Akin (1999) for invariant measures of diﬀerential inclusions.
9For example, if the saddlepoint is part of a heteroclinic cycle, again see Benaïm (1999) and Fort
and Pagès (1999).
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to rule out these unusual examples are themselves diﬃcult to verify. Thus, while we
would expect the time average of stochastic fictitious play to be close to the TASP in
Example 2 and in similar games, it can only be determined case by case.
The main results of this paper are that weighted fictitious play can give results that
are extraordinarily diﬀerent from the classical case. To clarify this claim, we conclude
this section by noting the diﬀerence is not so great if one looks at stable equilibria.
For example, when a game is negative definite, one can show that classical stochastic
fictitious play will converge with probability one to the associated perturbed equilibrium
(Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002)). As δ approaches 1, the probability that weighted
fictitious play will be far from the equilibrium falls to zero. Therefore, as we now see,
there is no qualitative diﬀerence between the limit as δ goes to one and the classical
case, in contrast to the situation for unstable equilibria.
Proposition 9 For a negative semidefinite game,
ν0(xˆ) = 1 (19)
where xˆ is the unique perturbed equilibrium.
Proof: From Hofbauer (2000) and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) we know that xˆ is
unique and globally asymptotically stable under the PBR dynamics. The result then
follows from well known results in stochastic approximation, for example, Theorem 3
in Benveniste et al. (1990, p44) and/or part (i) of Proposition 8.
7 Asymmetric Games
In this section, we consider games that are asymmetric in the evolutionary sense. That
is, there are two populations, one of row players, and one of column players. All players
only play against members of the other population. Again, it is possible to analyse both
the large population deterministic model and a truly stochastic alternative. However,
in the asymmetric framework the most natural way to treat the stochastic model is
to consider “populations” of size 1, where there is a single pair of players who play
repeatedly against each other.
Asymmetric games represent both an opportunity and a challenge. Hofbauer and
Hopkins (2005) show that in asymmetric games fully mixed equilibria are almost al-
ways saddlepoints and hence unstable under the PBR dynamics. That is, in contrast
to the symmetric situation where positive definite (unstable) and negative definite (sta-
ble) games are equally frequent, we would expect there to be divergence from almost
all mixed strategy equilibria. The only exceptions, as Hofbauer and Hopkins (2005)
find, are zero sum games and games that are linear transformations of zero sum games
(“rescaled” zero sum games). Furthermore, if there are no pure strategy equilibria for
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learning to converge to, there will often be convergence to a Shapley polygon instead.
See Rosenmüller (1971) and Krishna and Sjöström (1998) for results in this direction.
Thus, the TASP will be the best predictor for weighted stochastic fictitious play in
many asymmetric games without pure equilibria. One problem is that there can be
several stable Shapley polygons, so a selection problem arises between diﬀerent TASPs.
Another obstacle towards a general theory is that there are games without strict equi-
libria and stable Shapley polygons but chaotic attractors instead, see Cowan (1992) for
an example. But even in such games there is hope that time averages converge and the
limit is the same for most initial conditions.
Consequently, we do not attempt to give any general results.10 Instead, we give some
examples which we hope will be helpful. We need to augment our notation slightly.
The first population choose from N strategies, the second population has M strategies
available. Payoﬀs are determined by two matrices, A, which is N ×M , for the first
population, and B, which is M × N , for the second population. Beliefs of the second
population about the first at time t are xt ∈ SN and beliefs of the first population about
the second are yt ∈ SM .
The first example is how our initial example of an attracting Shapley polygon
changes when considered in the asymmetric framework.
Example 3 Consider the game
A = B =
0 -3 1
1 0 -2
-3 1 0
(20)
where the payoﬀs of game B in (1) are given to both players. We know from our earlier
analysis that in the symmetric case, the BR dynamics converge to a Shapley triangle.
In the asymmetric version, the corresponding cycle in beliefs generates play that is
along the diagonal: row players always play the same strategy as column players. This
symmetric Shapley triangle is easily shown to be locally attracting in the bimatrix BR
dynamics. Numerical simulations by one of us seem to suggest that from most initial
conditions beliefs will converge to it. However, this is in contrast to Berger’s (1995)
findings of other Shapley polygons (in the cyclically symmetric versions of the above
game). In particular there is a Shapley hexagon. The behavior near this hexagon seems
complicated and is not completely understood.
The next example shows how games that give rise to stable mixed equilibria in a
symmetric framework produce attracting Shapley polygons in the asymmetric alterna-
tive.
10One exception would be Proposition 6 on the ergodicity of stochastic fictitious play, which is easily
extended to the asymmetric case, see Hopkins (1999b).
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Example 4 Consider the game
A = B =
0 -1 3
2 0 -1
-1 3 0
(21)
where the payoﬀs of game A in (1) are given to both players. As this game is negative
definite, in the symmetric case the BR dynamics converges to the Nash equilibrium. In
the asymmetric version, beliefs will also converge if the initial conditions are such that
x = y. However, the equilibrium point is a saddlepoint and for all other initial condi-
tions, play converges to an asymmetric Shapley polygon following the strategy profiles
which the players never play on the diagonal.
Finally, we can consider a game that is truly asymmetric. One player has payoﬀs
that are not monocyclic and yet there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Example 5 Consider another game
A =
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
, B =
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
(22)
This truly asymmetric example is due to Shapley (1964) and has a unique fully mixed
equilibrium. Shapley used this example to demonstrate the convergence of fictitious
play to what we now call a Shapley polygon. Again, the mixed strategy equilibrium
is a saddlepoint under the BR dynamics, and from almost every initial condition, the
dynamics converge to the Shapley polygon.
What these examples together demonstrate is that attracting Shapley polygons exist
for a much wider class of games in the asymmetric setting than in the symmetric. Yet
at the same time this diversity prevents either easy classification or general results, but
see Rosenmüller (1971) and Krishna and Sjöström (1998).
8 Empirical Implications
We have seen that learning can converge to cycles, but the time average of those cycles
can be close to Nash equilibria. In this section, we do four things. First, we see if
this prediction is consistent with existing experimental evidence on games with mixed
strategy equilibria. One of our main arguments is that the time average of a cycle,
the TASP, can be very close to the time average of Nash equilibrium play. Thus our
second objective is to try to identify circumstances when in fact the TASP is distinct
from the Nash equilibrium, aiding identification. Third, we also try to identify how the
comparative statics of TASP’s and Nash equilibria can diﬀer. Finally, we compare the
predictions of stochastic fictitious play with those of other learning models.
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8.1 The TASP and Experimental Data
We start with one of the experiments of Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (MOS) (2003), who
examine repeated play of a version of the Varian (1980) model of price dispersion.11 A
group of subjects were repeatedly matched in pairs to play a duopoly game, in which
each player made a choice of price from the integers {0, 1, 2, ..., 100}. All sellers have
zero costs. Consumers are either informed or uninformed. The seller naming the lower
price captures all the informed consumers and half of the uninformed and sells 66 units.
The higher price seller sells only to uninformed for a total of 6 units. If the two sellers
tie on price, they each sell 36. One can see that the best response to a price of 100 is
99 and the best response to 99 is 98 and so on, down to a price of 10. But charging the
maximum price of 100 guarantees you a profit of at least 600, while the highest profit
available if one charges a price of 9 is 66× 9 = 594, and so 9 is dominated by 100. A
price of 100 also dominates all prices below 9. And so the best response to 10 is not 9
but 100. That is, there is a cycle of best responses like that in a RSP game and there
is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Although this game is not a monocyclic game,
numerical simulations suggest that the conclusion of Proposition 1 is still valid for this
game: from most initial conditions orbits of the BR dynamics converge to a unique
Shapley polygon that follows this best response cycle. However, what we can verify is
that this class of games are positive definite and therefore, its mixed Nash equilibria are
unstable under most known learning processes. This is analogous to the earlier result
of Hopkins and Seymour (2002) on the instability of the original Varian model.
Proposition 10 The discrete two player Varian model with strategy set of N prices
{p1, p2, ..., pN} with U > 0 uninformed buyers and I > 0 informed buyers gives rise to
a positive definite game. Thus, any mixed strategy equilibrium is unstable with respect
to the BR dynamics.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Yet, curiously as MOS report, the data, aggregated across time and diﬀerent sub-
jects, seems remarkably close to that which would have been generated by Nash equilib-
rium play. Prices are somewhat higher, however. Both distributions are illustrated in
Figure 2.12 MOS also report that there is significant autocorrelation in prices, which is
suggestive of price cycles produced by a learning process which has not converged. We
have calculated the TASP for this game by numerical simulation of the BR dynamics
and the resulting distribution is also given in Figure 2. It is clearly closer to the data
than is the Nash equilibrium, though it is not an exact fit.
11We discuss here only one of their treatments: a duopoly with 5/6 of the consumers informed. MOS
ran other treatments with four sellers and/or a smaller proportion of informed buyers.
12Following MOS, the figure gives the cumulative distribution for the mixed strategy equilibrium of
the original Varian model which assumes a continuum of prices. Mixed equilibria of the discrete game
have distributions which are almost identical.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions for prices in the Varian duopoly model
under the mixed Nash equilibrium (N), the TASP (T) and the data from the experiments
of Morgan et al. (2003) (D).
The diﬀerence between the empirical distribution and the TASP can be ascribed
to two possible explanations. First, under stochastic fictitious play, the time average
of play will only approach the TASP asymptotically. The experimental data may be
influenced by the initial conditions of the experiment. Second, under stochastic fictitious
play, play will only approach the TASP as δ approaches 1 and β approaches infinity.
Estimates of these parameters from other experiments (see, for example, Battalio et al.
(2001), Camerer and Ho (1999), Cheung and Friedman (1997) among others) are not
close to these limiting values and this may explain what we see here. For example, a
low value of δ would imply something closer to a simple best response or Edgeworth
cycle, which in the current game implies undercutting on prices as far as 10 and then
a return to 100. This in turn would imply a uniform distribution on [10, 100]. The
actual empirical distribution is somewhere between the TASP distribution and such a
uniform distribution. Distinguishing between these explanations would require a careful
econometric investigation, which is beyond the scope of the current work.
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Obviously, there are other potential explanations for behaviour of subjects in this
experiment. For example, a perturbed equilibrium such as a logit equilibrium would also
exhibit a stochastically higher distribution of prices than in Nash equilibrium. However,
the highly non-stationary behaviour of subjects (also reported in similar experiments
by Cason and Friedman (2003), Cason, Friedman and Wagener (2005) and by Brown
Kruse et al. (1994)) makes a static equilibrium concept, whether it be Nash or logit,
diﬃcult to apply to these circumstances. To our knowledge, only the current theory,
that identifies stable cycles in a learning process, can simultaneously explain how the
time average of data is similar but distinct from Nash, while at the same time the
distribution of prices is non-stationary.
Tang (2001) reports experiments on two 3 × 3 asymmetric games. In these ex-
periments, each member of the population of row players (with payoﬀ matrix A) was
repeatedly randomly matched with a column player (payoﬀ matrix B) for 150 periods.
The second game analysed was
A =
4 10 12
15 0 15
18 0 14
, B =
0 15 10
12 6 12
16 10 8
(23)
and has a unique mixed Nash equilibrium of (1/6, 1/3, 1/2) for both players. This we
find to be unstable under the BR dynamics and there is an attracting Shapley polygon.
Again we calculate the TASP numerically. This is represented in Figure 3, along with
the Nash equilibrium and the average of Tang’s data, aggregated across time and the
several sessions that he ran. Panel 1 is for the row players and panel 2 for the column
players.
Clearly, average play is somewhat closer to the TASP than to the Nash equilibrium.
This is encouraging, but as before we are aware there are competing explanations. Tang
himself finds that a logit quantal response equilibrium fits the data better than Nash
(though logit equilibrium has an extra free parameter compared with both Nash and
the TASP). However, this is purely on the basis of aggregate frequencies. Again, looking
at the pattern of play over time (for example, Figure 2 in Tang (2001)), there are clear
cycles and play is not stationary. This is not consistent with either Nash or quantal
response equilibria.
More recently Engle-Warnick and Hopkins (2005) provide further experimental sup-
port for the current theory. They investigate two 3×3 games with unique mixed strategy
equilibria that are asymmetric in the sense of Section 7. The equilibrium of one game is
unstable and the other stable under fictitious play. The time average of play converges
in both cases, rejecting the main predictions of the model under classical beliefs, while
being consistent with weighted stochastic fictitious play. The level of serial dependence
is higher, that is cycling is more pronounced, in the unstable games, also consistent
with the results obtained here.
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Figure 3: Average frequencies of play for the mixed Nash equilibrium (N), the TASP
(T) and the data from the experiments of Tang (2003) (D).
8.2 When is the TASP distinct from Nash equilibrium?
We move on to our second goal: to identify games where the TASP is significantly
diﬀerent from Nash equilibrium. Note that for any game that is completely symmetric
the mixed Nash equilibrium and the TASP will be identical. For example, if we take
the general RSP game in (1) and set a1 = a2 = a3 > b1 = b2 = b3, then the Nash
equilibrium and the TASP are both equal to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Since both the TASP and
the Nash equilibrium are continuous in payoﬀs, games that are almost symmetric will
give rise to only small diﬀerences beween the TASP and Nash. The game B in (1) is
an example of this.
However, it is possible to construct examples where the diﬀerences are much larger.
Take this variant of the RSP game.
C =
0 -3 1
1 0 -3
-3 b2 0
(24)
For b2 small, it can be verified that the game is positive definite and thus the mixed
equilibrium is unstable. Note that if we take the limit of b2 to zero, the Nash equilibrium
approaches (9, 13, 12)/34 ≈ (0.26,0.38,0.35), still close to the centre of the simplex.
In contrast, the limit of the TASP as b2 goes to zero is (0,1,0). The high weight
placed on the second strategy is a consequence of the vertex A2 of the Shapley polygon
approaching the point (0,1,0) as b2 approaches zero. On the edge between A1 and A2,
the BR dynamics are x˙2 = 1 − x2 and so when x2 is close to one, the speed at which
they approach A2 is extremely slow. Thus, a very long time is spent on the second edge.
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In the following game the diﬀerence between the TASP and any Nash equilibrium
is even more striking. It consists of a RSP game with the addition of another strategy
D (for “Dumb”).
RSPD =
0 -3 1 c
1 0 -3 c
-3 1 0 c
d d d 0
(25)
When c > 0, then this game has no pure strategy equilibrium. For example if c = 1/10
and d = −1/10, the unique Nash equilibrium is fully mixed and equal to (1, 1, 1, 17)/20.
It is possible to calculate that, under the BR dynamics, the Nash equilibrium is a
saddle with the stable manifold being the line satisfying x1 = x2 = x3. Thus for almost
all initial conditions, the BR dynamics diverge. When the weights on the first three
strategies are no longer equal, the fourth strategy is not a best reply, so that any weight
on x4 tends to die out as play diverges from equilibrium. But on the face where x4 = 0,
we have the original RSP game, and with the above parameter values, there will be a
Shapley polygon on the face. Indeed, it is easy to calculate the TASP in this case as
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0). That is, the Nash equilibrium places a weight of 17/20 on the fourth
strategy and the TASP places no weight on it whatsoever. For this game, the Nash
equilibrium and the TASP are quite distinct.
A potential diﬃculty in testing the above examples experimentally is that the clarity
of the above predictions is reduced once noise is introduced. For example, the time
average of any limit cycle of the PBR dynamics in the game RPSD will give positive
weight to the strategy D, as the PBR dynamics always give positive weight to all
strategies. Similarly, also in RSPD, the logit equilibrium corresponding to the Nash
equilibrium will place greater weight on R, S and P than the Nash equilibrium does.
Nonetheless, the initial distinctions are so great, we would expect some diﬀerence to
remain.
8.3 Are the Comparative Statics of the TASP Diﬀerent from
those of Nash Equilibrium?
As point predictions are sometimes diﬃcult to test, we can also perform some simple
comparative statics. Take a symmetric RSP game and then add a constant to the
payoﬀs to the first strategy.
ε −a+ ε b+ ε
b 0 −a
−a b 0
(26)
If the parameter ε is zero, the game is entirely symmetric and the Nash equilibrium and
the TASP are equal to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). We can calculate the weight placed on the first
strategy in the Nash equilibrium as
1
3
+ ε
b− a
3(a2 + ab+ b2)
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That is, when a > b, which would imply that the mixed equilibrium is unstable under
the BR dynamics, we have a counterintuitive result: an increase in the payoﬀs of the
first strategy results in a reduction in the frequency of the first strategy in the mixed
equilibrium. In contrast, one can calculate that
∂x˜1
∂ε
¯¯¯¯
ε=0
=
(a− b)2(a+ b)
3ab(a2 + ab+ b2) log(a/b)
Thus, the eﬀect is the opposite. When a > b, so that the TASP exists, an increase in
the payoﬀ to the first strategy results in a greater weight on the first strategy in the
TASP.
8.4 Does the TASP Give a Prediction Distinct from that of
Other Learning Models?
Fictitious play is not the only model of learning in games. It is important to clarify
whether the prediction of convergence to the TASP is robust across diﬀerent models,
or whether other models suggest a completely diﬀerent outcome. First, reinforcement
learning in economics has been popularised by Erev and Roth (1998). Hopkins (2002)
shows that the asymptotic predictions of their model are largely similar to those of
fictitious play. For example, mixed equilibria in asymmetric games are generically
unstable under reinforcement learning. Now, the basic one parameter model of Erev
and Roth has a step size that is of order 1/t so that its time average will not converge
to a mixed equilibrium in such circumstances. However, their three parameter model
(which allows for noise and recency) will, like weighted stochastic fictitious play, be
ergodic (Hopkins (1999b)) and therefore will have a convergent time average even when
all equilibria are unstable. Whether this time average is related to the TASP is, however,
at this point pure speculation.
Second, there are learning models that have better convergence properties than
fictitious play (see Young (2004) for a recent survey). One is due to Hart and Mas-
Colell (2000). In their model, the time average of play converges to the set of correlated
equilibria of the game in question. In the RSP games the only correlated equilibrium is
the Nash equilibrium (see Viossat (2005)) and so the Hart—Mas-Colell model predicts
learning should always converge in this class of games, something that is in distinct
contrast with the learning models considered here. In contrast, the Shapley game
(Example 5 in this paper) is an example of a game where if beliefs cycle on the Shapley
polygon, play follows the best response cycle that avoids the outcomes where both
players receive a payoﬀ of zero. This pattern of play is a correlated equilibrium. In such
games the model of Hart and Mas Colell is not necessarily in conflict with the weighted
version of stochastic fictitious play. However, the set of correlated equilibria is typically
large, whereas the TASP is a single point, and as a prediction it oﬀers greater precision.
Finally, Foster and Young (2003) introduce a learning model that always converges
to Nash equilibrium. More precisely, there are parameter values of the model, such
25
that players’ mixed strategies will be close to Nash equilibrium for most of the time.
It thus oﬀers a diﬀerent prediction from stochastic fictitious play, whether beliefs are
weighted or classical, which predicts that players’ mixed strategies should diverge from
equilibrium in games such as game B in (1).
9 Conclusions
Much of the recent work on learning in games has been concerned with selection be-
tween diﬀerent Nash equilibria, or with providing an adaptive basis for equilibrium play.
In this paper, we take a completely diﬀerent approach. We found that in some games
learning under stochastic fictitious play has a non-equilibrium outcome, which never-
theless gives a precise prediction about play. We introduced the TASP (time average of
the Shapley polygon), building on earlier results by Shapley (1964) and Gaunersdorfer
and Hofbauer (1995), as an outcome for the time average of play. This we suggest
could be useful in understanding behaviour in a number of economically interesting
models, including the Varian (1980) model of price dispersion and Bertrand-Edgeworth
competition.
This also represents one of the first attempts at analysis of learning in games when
players place greater weight on more recent experience. Most previous work on stochas-
tic fictitious play and reinforcement learning has examined models with learning that
slows over time. This is despite the fact that most empirical work fitting learning mod-
els to experimental data has found that weighting recent experience more highly gives a
better fit. The two types of models do give similar predictions when considering games
that have Nash equilibria that are stable under learning. The finding here, however, is
that they give radically diﬀerent results when considering equilibria that are unstable.
We hope that the theoretical results in this paper will form the basis for further em-
pirical and/or experimental investigation. It is likely, however, that some modification
of the TASP will be required for empirical work, in the same way that recent research
has found that perturbed equilibria such as quantal response equilibria (McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995)) often fit experimental data better than Nash. In the case of the time
average of stochastic fictitious play, there are two parameters than can aﬀect the long
run outcome. Just as for quantal response equilibria, there is a noise parameter, but in
weighted stochastic fictitious play there is also the parameter the controls the degree
of forgetting or recency. However, these parameters have been jointly estimated in ex-
isting attempts to fit stochastic fictitious play to experimental data (see Cheung and
Friedman (1997), Camerer and Ho (1999), Battalio et al. (2001) among others). There
is, therefore, no fundamental barrier to taking the TASP to the data.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Let Bi be set of points x ∈ SN with i being the unique best
reply, and Bij be set of points x ∈ SN with precisely two pure best replies i and j. The
union of all Bi is open, dense and has full (N−1) dimensional Lebesgue measure in SN .
Let B =
Sn
i=1B
i∪
Sn
i=1B
i−1,i. We will show that B is strongly forward invariant under
the best response dynamics and all orbits there approach a unique Shapley polygon
contained in B.
Suppose x ∈ B1, i.e., (Ax)1 > (Ax)j for all j 6= 1. Then x(t) = e−tx + (1− e−t)e1
and (Ax(t))1 = e−t(Ax)1 and for j 6= 1, 2,
(Ax(t))j = e−t(Ax)j + (1− e−t)aj1 < e−t(Ax)j < e−t(Ax)1 = (Ax(t))1. (27)
So along the ray from x to e1, the best response can only switch from 1 to 2 which
indeed must happen for some t > 0, since a21 > 0.
Hence the orbit hits B12. The only way to continue is towards e2. Repeating the
above argument shows that orbits in B12 move into B23, etc, and finally from BN1 back
into B12. This defines a continuous return map f : BN1 → BN1. f is single-valued as
solutions starting in B are unique. f is a composition of projective maps and hence
a projective map itself. Being uniformly continuous, it can be extended to the closure
B¯N1 of the convex polyhedron BN1. A fixed point of f in BN1 generates a closed
orbit under the best response dynamics, an invariant N-gon, i.e., a Shapley polygon.
However, since B¯N1 contains the interior equilibrium x∗ we cannot directly apply a fixed
point theorem to prove the existence of the Shapley polygon.
Define V (x) = maxi(Ax)i. As shown above for x ∈ B1, along any solution x(t) ∈ B,
V (x(t)) = e−tV (x). Hence V (x(t))→ 0, as t→∞.
The set B0 = B ∩ {x ∈ SN : V (x) = 0} is forward invariant and its closure contains
no equilibrium, since V (xˆ) = xˆ ·Axˆ < 0 holds for each equilibrium xˆ (by assumption
for the interior equilibrium x∗, and automatically for each boundary equilibrium of a
monocyclic game). Since V (x∗) < 0 and V (ei) = ai+1,i > 0, each ray from x∗ to a
point x near ei hits the set {V = 0} in a unique point which is thus contained in
Bi+10 = B
i+1 ∩ {x ∈ SN : (Ax)i+1 = 0}, a convex (N − 2)—dimensional set. The
sets Bi,i+10 are therefore (N − 3)—dimensional. The closure B¯N10 is a closed and convex
polyhedron, mapped by f into itself. So by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, it contains
a fixed point (which cannot be an equilibrium). Its orbit is a Shapley polygon Γ.
To prove uniqueness and stability of this Shapley polygon, we use the projective
metric d, as in Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995). The distance between two points
x, y ∈ intBN10 (the relative interior13 of BN10 ) is given by the logarithm of the double
13The relative interior intC of a convex set C ⊆ RN is the interior of C within the aﬃne space
spanned by it. The relative boundary of C is then given by bdC = C¯ \ intC.
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with p, q being the intersection points of the line through x, y with the relative boundary
of BN10 . Since f(B¯
N1
0 ) ⊆ B¯N10 , we have d(f(x), f(y)) ≤ d(x, y) for x, y ∈ intBN10 . Now
(27) holds for j 6= 1, 2 with a strict inequality even under the weaker assumption
(Ax)1 ≥ (Ax)j for all j and (Ax)1 > (Ax)2. This shows that for x ∈ bdBN10 (with at
least a third best reply j besides N and 1), f(x) ∈ intBN10 = BN10 ∩ intSN . Hence
f(B¯N10 ) ⊆ intBN10 , and hence d(f(x), f(y)) < d(x, y) for x, y ∈ intBN10 with x 6= y.
Hence, by a variant of Banach’s fixed point theorem, the fixed point of f is unique and
attracts all orbits in B¯N10 .
Hence all orbits in B approach the Shapley polygon Γ, and Γ is Lyapunov stable.
Remark. The complement of B consists of all points with at least two non—
successive pure best replies (or more than two best replies). The behavior of orbits
starting outside B depends in an intricate way on the payoﬀ matrix. Typically, solu-
tions starting in x /∈ B are not unique. From every x /∈ B (except possibly x∗) there
exists at least one solution that enters B and hence converges to Γ. The solutions stay-
ing in SN \B can converge to a Nash equilibrium or, for N ≥ 5, to an unstable Shapley
polygon contained in SN \B.
Proof of Proposition 2: We first show that a positive definite game has only finitely
many equilibria. Suppose there are two equilibria, xˆ and x˜, satisfying
(Axˆ)1 = (Axˆ)2 = · · · = (Axˆ)N (28)
and similar for x˜. Then (xˆ− x˜)·A(xˆ− x˜) = 0 contradicts positive definiteness. Applying
these to ‘subgames’ (with restricted support) which are still positive definite we see that
each face of SN contains at most one equilibrium.
In particular, this implies that every solution of the BR dynamics is piecewise linear,
see Hofbauer (1995).
We now use the Ljapunov function from Hofbauer (2000)
V (x) = max
i
(Ax)i − x·Ax. (29)
Note that V (x) ≥ 0 for all x and V (x) = 0 if and only if x is a NE. We show that
in a positive definite game, V (x(t)) increases along almost all solutions x(t) of the BR
dynamics starting near an equilibrium xˆ. Since V (x) = (b−x)·Ax for b ∈ b(x), we have
along a piecewise linear solution
V˙ = b·Ax˙− x˙·Ax− x·Ax˙ = (b− x)·A(b− x)− x˙·Ax = (b− x)·A(b− x)− V (x) (30)
The first term is nonnegative in a positive definite game.
Suppose that xˆ is an equilibrium with (28). (Usually such equilibria are completely
mixed.) Let I be the support of xˆ. Suppose for some x 6= xˆ, I ⊆ b(x). Then xˆ ∈ b(x) and
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xˆ·Ax ≥ x·Ax. On the other hand, (28) implies xˆ·Axˆ = x·Axˆ. Hence (xˆ−x)·A(xˆ−x) ≤ 0,
contradicting positive definiteness. Hence, for all x 6= xˆ, b(x) does not contain I. So
b(x) is contained in boundary faces opposite to xˆ. Therefore the distance |b− x| (with
b ∈ b(x)) has a positive lower bound for x close to (but diﬀerent from) xˆ. Using positive
definiteness again, this shows that the first term, (b−x)·A(b−x), in the RHS of (30) has
a positive lower bound, so V increases along each orbit near xˆ. Hence xˆ is a repellor.
Finally consider an arbitrary equilibrium xˆ with I denoting its set of pure best
replies. Then for x close to xˆ, the pure best replies to x are contained in I. Hence the
face spanned by I is locally (near xˆ) invariant under the BR dynamics (and attracts
orbits nearby). Hence we can apply the above argument to the game with restricted
strategy set I and conclude that all orbits in this face starting close to xˆmove away from
xˆ. Hence xˆ is unstable. This argument works whenever I has at least two elements, i.e.
xˆ is not a strict equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3:14 We take the Liapunov function from Hofbauer (2000) and
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002)
U(x) = π(p(x), x)− π(x, x) = (p(x)− x) ·Ax+ λ(v(p(x))− v(x)) ≥ 0 (31)
where again λ = β−1. Then U has a minimum on SN at xˆ. Then, under the dynamics
(13), we have
U˙ = (p(x)− x) ·A(p(x)− x) + λ(p(x)− x) · (v0(p(x))− v0(x))
Now, the second term on the right hand side is negative by the concavity of v(·), but the
first term of right hand side is positive as A is positive definite by assumption. Then in
the neighbourhood of x∗, for β suﬃciently large, we have U˙ positive, and the perturbed
equilibrium is a repellor.
Proof of Proposition 4: The Shapley polygon Γ with corners A1, · · · , AN is an
attractor (= asymptotically invariant set) for (3) whose basin of attraction B is open
and dense in SN , and the complement SN \ B has zero Lebesgue measure. For small
γ > 0, the map (2) has an attractor nearby with basin of attraction exhausting B as
γ → 0. (This is well-known for discretisations of diﬀerential equations, see e.g. Stuart
and Humphries (1996) or Garay and Hofbauer (1997). The corresponding result for
diﬀerential inclusions needed here for the BR dynamics follows readily by combining
their results and methods of proof with those in Benaïm et al. (2003)). The time
average wˆt converges to a space average over the attractor of the map (2) with respect
to some invariant measure, which tends to the unique measure invariant under the BR
dynamics concentrated on the Shapley polygon in the limit as γ goes to zero (Miller and
Akin (1999)). The space average with respect to this unique invariant measure equals
the time average given by the expression (4). The other limit follows from the relation
wt − wˆt =
1
t
tX
s=1
(b(xs)− xs) =
1
t
1
γ
(xt+1 − x1)→ 0,
14This result on instability is proved by means of a Liapunov function, but one could also apply the
local linearisation result of Hopkins (1999a).
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as t approaches infinity.
Proof of Proposition 6: If the player chooses action i then denote that event as i
and event operator fi. Norman (1968) defines a Markov process on a metric space with
metric d to be “strictly distance diminishing” if ρ(fi) < 1 for all i where
ρ(f) = sup
x6=x0
d(f(x), f(x0))
d(x, x0)
.
Lemma 1 The Markov process defined by stochastic fictitious play with forgetting, that
is, with belief updating rule (11) with γt = 1 − δ is strictly distance diminishing with
respect to the standard Euclidean metric.
Proof: Given arbitrary states x, x0, fi(x) = (1−δ)Xij+δx and fi(x0) = (1−δ)Xi+δx0.
It is easy to show therefore that d(fi(x), fi(x0)) = δd(x, x0) and ρ(fi) = δ for all possible
events.
Let Tn(x) be the set of states reached with positive probability in n steps if we start
at x. Let d(S1, S2) be distance between two subsets S1 and S2 of the state space. That
is,
d(S1, S2) = inf
x∈S1,x0∈S2
d(x, x0)
Then Norman (1968) was able to show that if the following condition holds
lim
t→∞
d(Tt(x), Tt(x0)) = 0 for all x, x0 ∈ S (32)
then a strictly distance diminishing Markov process is ergodic. Norman’s result (The-
orem 2.2, p66) applies to strictly distance diminishing Markov processes on a compact
metric space, here SN , where the number of possible events are finite, here N . So, we
simply need to verify the condition (32). From an arbitrary initial state x1 there is a
positive probability that each player chosen continues to choose the first action for an
indefinite number of periods. As this run of play continues, xt will approach the state
X1. This state is therefore accessible from any initial state and from the theorem of
Norman, the Markov process is ergodic.
Proof of Proposition 7: The probability measure ν0 is an invariant measure of the
dynamics induced by φβ. Hence by the Poincaré recurrence theorem, its support is
contained is the Birkhoﬀ center of φβ (see e.g. Benaim, 1998, Corollary 3.2).
The second assertion follows from Theorem 3.2 of Fort and Pagès (1999). According
to this theorem, it suﬃces to verify that properties (I) and (II) below hold in order to
conclude that ν0(xˆ) = 0.
(I) The process (xt) can be written as
xt+1 − xt = γH(xt, ωt+1) (33)
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where (ωt) is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, and (x, ω) 7→ H(x, ω) is a
bounded measurable function continuous in x at point xˆ, for almost every ω.
(II) (a) There exists a C2 real valued function U defined on a neighborhood W of xˆ
in SN such that for all x ∈W \ {xˆ}, h∇U(x), φβ(x)i > 0 and U(x) > U(xˆ)
(b) there exists u ∈ kerD2U(xˆ)⊥ such that the variance term
E(hxt+1 − xt
γ
, ui2|xt = xˆ) =
NX
i=1
h−xˆ+ ei, ui2xˆi
is positive.
Let (ωt) be a sequence of independent uniformly distributed random variables in [0, 1].
Set H(x, ω) = −x + ei for
Pi−1
j=0 pj(x) ≤ ω <
Pi
j=0 pj(x) and i = 1, . . . , N. Then
x 7→ H(x, ω) is continuous at xˆ for every ω ∈ [0, 1] \ ∪Ni=1{
Pi−1
j=0 xˆj}, by continuity of
the map x 7→ p(x). Furthermore
Pr(H(x, ωt) = −x+ ei) = pi(x).
Hence, we can always assume that (xt) satisfies (33).
We now check (II). The function U(x) = π(p(x), x) introduced in the proof of propo-
sition 2 satisfies (a). A simple computation yields
∇U(x) = AT (p(x)− x)−Ax− λv0(x)
and, using λ = β−1,
D2U(x) = ATp0(x)− (A+AT )− λv00(x) = −βATv00(p(x))−1A− (A+AT )− v00(x)/β
so that for β large enoughD2U(x) is invertible ( 1β det(D
2U(x)) 7→ −det(A∗v00(p(x))−1A) 6=
0) and condition (b) reduces to prove that
NX
i=1
h−xˆ+ ei, ui2xˆi > 0
for some u in the tangent space of SN . This is obviously true since the family (ei −
xˆ)i=1,...,N spans the tangent space of SN .
Proof of Proposition 10: With prices {p1, p2, ..., pN} (given in ascending order), the
payoﬀ matrix has the form
A =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
p1(U + I)/2 p1(U/2 + I) . . . p1(U/2 + I)
p2U/2 p2(U + I)/2 . . . p2(U/2 + I)
...
...
. . .
...
pNU/2 pNU/2 . . . pN(U + I)/2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
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where U is the number of uninformed and I is the number of informed.
LetA0 be theN−1×N−1matrix formed by the formula a0,ij = aij−aiN−aNj+aNN .
The matrix A is positive definite with respect to RN0 if A0 is positive definite. We find
that
A0 +AT0 = I
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
pN − p1 pN − p2 pN − p3 . . . pN − pN−1
pN − p2 pN − p2 pN − p3 . . . pN − pN−1
pN − p3 pN − p3 pN − p3 . . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
pN − pN−1 pN − pN−1 . . . . . . pN − pN−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
One can subtract columns of a matrix from other columns without any change to its
determinant. Here, we can can subtract the N − 1th column from all others, then the
(N −2)th from all to its left and continue recursively until we have an upper triangular
matrix with p2 − p1, p3 − p2, ...., pN − pN−1 on its diagonal. The determinant is clearly
positive. One can repeat the procedure for each principal minor and obtain a similar
result. Thus, A0 is positive definite, and hence so is A with respect to RN0 . Instability
of mixed strategy equilibria then follows from Proposition 2.
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